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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,

Respondent,
Case No.
vs.

17342

THEODORE SAMUEL
PACHECO,

Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

APPEAL
STATEl\fENT OF THE CASE
This is an appeal brought by the Appellant from
a verdict of guilty rendered by a jury on the counts of
2nd Degree Burglary and Grand Larceny.
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The facts offer1ed at trial were that Defendant together with two co-defendants were apprehended in the
Payless Builders Supply approximately 1 :30 a.m. on the
12th day of Dec:ember, 1960. Further, that there was
1nissing out of the cash box the sum of $124.67; none
of which was found in the possession of the Defendant
at the time he was apprehended.
Approximately three hours before the apprehension,
one Gerald D. Shelton, co-defendant, notified a member
of the Salt Lake City Police Department, namely, Gary
Parks, that a burglary was to be committed at the Ream's
Bargain Basement located at 2700 South State Street,
Salt Lake ·City, Utah. After notifying Gary Parks, Gerald D. Shelton went looking for the Defendant-Appellant
and located him at a house belonging to the Defendant's
fiance. Shortly thereafter, the Defendant, Gerald D.
Shelton and Johnny J\furkhan1 went do:wn to Ream's
Bargain Basement, but no crime offense was conlmitted.
Having decided not to com1nit the crime, the three went
to the Payless Builders Supply. Enroute, they stopped
at a gas station at the request of Gerald D. Shelton.
At that point, Shelton gave the attendant a slip of paper
hearing Gary Park's home phone number and informed
the attendant that he was an undercover agent for the
Salt Lake Police Deparhnent and to call the nu1nber on
the slip of paper and to say "the Payless Lmnber the
ti1ne has been changed." After the Defendant left, the
attendant ca11ed the number and a wmnan answered.
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3.

The woman indicated that she knew nothing of the situation. \VhPreupon, the attendant called the Salt Lake
Police Departinent and released the information. Shortly thereafter, Gary Parks, in the company of Sheriff Pete
Haywood, Salt Lake City Sheriff Department, arrived
and took possession of the piece of paper. From the gas
station the~, proceeded up to Payless Builders Supply
and apprehended the Defendant-Appellant and co-defendants.
This appeal raises for review by this court, three
questions of law:
POINT I
THE COURT ERRED IN DENYING DEFENDANT'S
TO DISMISS THE SECOND COUNT OF THE INFORMATION, TO WIT: GRAND LARCENCY, ON THE GROUNDS
THAT THERE WAS INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE OF THAT
CHARGE.
POINT II
TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL ERROR IN
ALLOWING THE JURY TO SEPARATE AFTER THE CASE
WAS SUBMITTED 'TO THEM FOR THEIR DELIBERATION.
POINT III
THE EVIDENCE WAS INSUFFICIENT TO JUSTIFY
THE JURY IN FINDING THE DEFENDANT GUILTY OF
SECOND DEGREE BURGLARY AND GRAND LARCENY
ON THE GROUNDS THAT THE EVIDENCE SHOWED THAT
THE DEFENDANT WAS ENTRAPED INTO THE COM:\IISSION OF THE CRIME.
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE COURT ERRED IN DENYING DEFENDANT'S
TO DISMISS THE SECOND COUNT OF THE INFORMA·TION, TO WIT: GRAND LARCENCY, ON THE GROUNDS
THAT THERE WAS INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE OF THAT
CHARGE.

Grand Larceny is defined in Utah Code Annotated
(1953) 76-38-1 and 4 as "The felonious stealing, taking,
carrying, leading or drawing away of personal property
of another." Said property taken is of the value exceeding $50.00.
The testimony produced at trial indicated that the
cash box contained $124.67 (R. 37). Also, the evidenc.e
adduced by the State indicated that the sum of $80.00
was taken from Johnny Markham (R. 66), and that the
sum of $50.00 was found to he in the possession of Gerald
D. Shelton (R. 135). No n1oney was found on the
Defendant's person (R. 54, R. 78, R. 108). It was further
borne out at trial that the n1oney was never taken from
the premises of the Payless Builders Supply.
Possession under the above quoted section has been
construed as meaning personal, conscious, and exclusive
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possession. State vs. Dyitt, 114 Utah 379, 199 P. 2d 155
(l~H~); State vs. Brooks (1942), 101 Utah 584, 126 P. 2d
l 0-l--t-. There was no evidence elicited to the effect that
the Defendant had possession of any of the monies taken
fron1 the cash box. Further, the fact that the participants
of the criine were apprehended in the very room where
the money was kept, the money had not yet been reduced
to the exclusive possession of any of the participants.

It is respe·c.tfully submitted that possession must be
of the type inconsistent with the possession of the true
O\vner and until said property is taken from the premises
or room, the possession of the participants is. not sufficient. to warrant exclusive don1ination of the property.
Not having found proof proving exclusive possession on the part of the Defendant, the trial court relied
npon the theory of principals (R. 80), i.e., possession of
those who· are found to have aided and abetted is sufficient possession. Tlris application of the theory is an
erroneous application of the law. As the record abundantly illustrates, Gerald D. Shelton cannot be said to
have asstuned the role of an acemnplice. In the case of
TVil.'wn vs. People (1939), 103 Colo. 441, 87 P. 2d 5, 120
A.L.R. 1501, the court cites Price vs. People, 109 Ill. 109,
P. 115, llG, wherein Defendant contacted the constable,
giving true nanws and place, time, and nrune of intended
Yietinl. After the erilne, he went and furnished the particulars of the eri1ne. The court held:
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"That a sane person really guilty of committing a grave crime would thus act is so inconsistent with all human experience as not to warrant the conviction of anyone under the circumstances shown."
The record clearly shows that he executed every
effort to contact the police of the change in plans and
also was instructed by Gary Parks, Salt Lake Police
Department, to go along with planned burglary. The
record is void of any intent on the part of Gerald D.
Shelton to commit the crime of burglary and grand larceny. Query: Can the Defendant be charged with the
aiding and abetting of another participant ·when the
latter cannot be found to possess the requisite intent
or possession necessary for the commission of the crime.
It is submitted that the only answer is no.
POINT II
TRIAL COURT COMMI'TTED PREJUDICIAL ERROR IN
ALLOWING THE JURY TO SEPARATE AFTER THE CASE
WAS SUBMITTED ·TO THEM FOR THEIR DELIBERATION.

The trial court permitted the jury to separate for
the noon hour frmn 12 :00 p.m. to 1 :30 p.m. (R. 161).
The separation occurred without the consent of the
Defendant and after the closing arguments of the State
and the Defense (R. 161). The instructions to the jury
preceded the closing arglunents (R. 152, 161).
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Utah law in this area is largely derived from statutes
wher<>in the Trial Court is instructed as to the proper
:;;upervision over the jury.
Utah Code Annotated 77-31-27 (1953 as amended)
states: •' The jurors sworn to try a criminal action may,
at any time before submission of the case to the jury,
in the discretion of the Court, be permitted to separate
or be kept in charge of a proper officer" ... The statutes
are silent as to separation of the jury after submission.
Directing our attention to what constitut!es "subInission", we find that the general rule is that where
eharges precede the arguments, submission occurs at the
(•lose of the argument. 34 A.L.R. 1212. People vs. Von
Jfaltic (1931), 119 CaL App. 568, 5 P. 2d 917; Evans vs.
State (192-1), ______ Okla. Cr. Rep., ______ 221 P. 794. This
would be applicable in the instant case.
Generally, in felony criminal cases, prejudice is
i>resunied from the fact if an unauthorized separation
after submission, at least where the circumstances are
~ueh as. to 1nake it reasonably appear that the jury
might have been tampered with. 53 Am. Jur. Sec. 879.
It should be noted that although there does exist
a statute allowing the Trial Court, in its discretion, to
pennit the jury to separate before submission, there is
no statute ·which allows this discretion after the. case
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has been finally submitted to the jury. Can it he successfully advaneed that the Trial Court has the implied
authority to that concerning which the law is silent~ This
precise question confronted North Dakota courts in 1932
and the court clearly indicated that a statute similar
to that found in Utah is the only statute which gives the
court the authority to separate jurors and that the trial
court does not obtain the implied authority to separate
the jury. State vs. Tamoreaux (1932, 241 N.D. 595).
Utah Code Annotated (1953), 77-31-32, states:
"After hearing the charge, the jury may
decide in court or may retire for deliberation. If they do not agree without retiring, an
officer must be sworn to keep them together in
some private and convenient place, and not to
permit any person to speak to or communicate
with them, nor to do so himself, unless by order
of the court, or to ask them whether they have
agreed upon a verdict, and to return them into
court when they have so agreed, or when ordered
by the court."
~either

This statute has been wisely interpreted to safeguard in every possible way the purity of the stream of
justice; and to pr,event it from in any manner being
polluted by influences other than those which are produced by the legal evidence and the law governing the
case. Bilton vs. Territory (1909), 1 Old. Cr. 566, 99 P.
163.
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Again, in Armstrong vs. State (1909), 2 Okla. Cr.
5G7, 103 Par. 658, 24 L.R.A. (N.S.) 776, the court stated
that this section imperatively required that the jury
cannot be separated after submission and, if such separation is permitted, the verdict is vitiated notwithstanding
no affirmative proof of prejudice is offered. The court
further stated:
"vVhen this provision of law if violated, the
legal presumption is that it has actually prejudiced the Defendant, or tended to his prejudice,
in respect to a substantial right."
Thus, it would appear that the Defendant's substantial rights had been violated by the trial court's permitting the separation of the jury after the cause had
been finally submitted.
The precise question here on appeal is a novel one.
In State vs. Thorne (1911), 39 U. 208, 117 P. 58, the
question presented dealt with the misconduct of a juror
who n1ade unauthorized telephone conversation to someone without the court's permission. The court proper
said:
"After a final submission to the jury and
before reaching a decision as to their verdict, to
permit a juror without court's permission to leave
his fellow jurors and to go to another portion of
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the building and there engage in a private conversation over the telephone is a practice not to
be tolerated."
Again, in State vs. Jarrett (1947), 112 Utah 335, 187
P. 2d 547, this court held that it was not reversible
error to deny the motion for new trial on the grounds
that some~ of the jurors separated without leave of the
court. The s~eparation was based upon necessity and
under the surveillance of the Baliff. The court further
states that it is conversation ·with third parties that are
condemned and that the Defendant has a right to have a
jury secluded from outside influences while deliberating
and that this right should be jealously guarded.
It cannot· be said ·that trial court, in permitting the
jury to separate after all of the evidence had been subn1itted, after the instructions ""\Vere delivered and after
arguments of counsel, jealously guarded the Defendant'~
right to have the jury secluded frmn outside influences.
Concededly, absolute isolation is not reasonably possible.

State vs. Jarrett, supra. Yet, it is unreasonable to
allow separation foi~ lunch after subn1ission without
supervision of the Baliff in view of the 1Jtah statute
pennitting the jurors to be provided with food. See
1JCA 77-32-1. It cannot he successfully 1naintained that
during the hour and a half hmch period tl1at none of
the jurors had any conversations with third persons.
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POINT III
THE EVIDENCE WAS INSUFFICIENT TO JUSTIFY
THE JURY IN FINDING THE DEFENDANT GUILTY OF
SECOND DEGREE BURGLARY AND GRAND LARCENY
ON THE GROUNDS THAT THE EVIDENCE SHOWED THAT
THE DEFENDANT WAS ENTRAPED INTO THE COMMISSION OF THE CRIME.

Although the doctrine of entrapment is found to
exist in all the jurisdictions in the country, t'here does
exist a divergence of views as the basis upon which
ths doctrine lies. Serrells vs. United States, 287 U.S. 435,
53 S. Ct. 210, 77 L. 2d 413, wherein the purported basis
was fotmded upon statutory constriction. Later in Sherman vs. U.S. (1958), 356 U.S. 332, 78 S. Ct. 819, 2 L. Ed.
:2 -!-!~, the language of the n1ajority indicates that the
majorit~~ is thinking in terms of Supreme Court's supervisory function over the administration of criminal justee in the Federal Court or in terms of a violation of the
constitution protected right. See 49 Jo1tn. Grim. Law 449
(1959).
This court as early as 1912 established the policy
that this court would, and properly so, carefully scrutinize the evidence the offense was induced by, so-called
private detectives and informers. Chief Justice Frick
in City vs. Robinson (1912), 40 Utah 448, 125 Pac. 667,
661 stated:
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"When it is n1ade to appear that an offense
charged was induced by a detective or other or
that such detective or person was paid for obtaining the evidence necessary to convict, or that he
is to receive additional compensation in case of
conviction, both the prosecuting officers and the
trial courts should carefully scrutinize the evidence and should permit no conviction to be had,
or if had, to stand in case the offense was induced
as aforesaid, and in case of paid evidence none
should be perrnitted to stand if there is any doubt
of the guilt of the accused."
Nine years later, this court endorsed the principles
set forth by Chief Justice Frick in a unanimous opinion
in State vs. McCamish (1921), 59 Utah 58, 201 P. 637,
rehe,aring denied 1921, wherein the court added:
"Policemen are conservators of the peace.
It is their duty to prevent crime, not to instigate
or encourage its cOinmission. Nothing is more
reprehensible than to induce the commission of
crime for the purpose of apprehending and convicting the perpetrator~"
In denying the petition for rehearing, the court
reiterated its position by stating:
"'r:l'he rule that officers of the law are not perInitted to induce aets eonstituting erin1es which
would not have been cmn1nitted but for such
inducement and that convictions based upon such
induce1nent will not be pennitted to stand, is both
wholesmne and saluting onee should be enforced.''
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Thus, it would appear that this court bases the doctrine of 0ntrapment on the same grounds as is found
in the Sherma ll case, supra, and properly so, inasmuch
aH the same policy bases for reversal of a judgment as is
found in judicial supervision of contempts, or to exclude
illegally seized evidence or coerced confessions, to wit:
"Judicial supervision of administration of
criminal justice in Federal courts implies the duty
of establishing and maintaining civilized standards of procedure." Jl!l eN abb vs. U.S., 318 U.S.
332 (1943). Also, see Jones vs. State (1960), 101
Ga. 851, 101 Ga. 851, 115 S.E. 2d 576, wherein
the court stated :
''Prosecutor's conduct falls short of the high
standards that must be set by law enforcement
officers in administration of justice in the sovereign state of Georgia and we cannot approve
of it.''
This attitude is abundantly exhibited in one of our
states, narnely, California, where the court stated
in Peop1r vs. JJ![akovsky (1935), Cal. 2d 366, 44 P. 2d 536,
People Y~. Calwn (1955 ), 44- Cal. 2d 434, 282 P. 2d 905,
50 A.L.R. 2d 513, and People vs. Bevford (1959), 53 Cal.
:2d l, 34-5 P. 2d 928. An excellent discussion is found
in the latter case where the court through Justice
~ehauer stated that California has recognized the defense
for reasons substantially sirnilar to those which cause
the adoption of the rule that evidence obtained in violation of constitutional guarantees is not admissible, i.e. :
~ister
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"Without regard for its own dignity, and
in the exercise of its power and performance of
its duty to formulate and apply proper standard
for judicial enforcement of criminal law, the court
refuses to enable officers of the law to consummate illegal or unjust schemes designed to foster
ratherthan prevent and detect crime.'' P. 933.
Thus, it would appear that this court has assumed
the supervisory role over the administration of justice
in our state and will not permit any conviction to he had
where there exists any doubt of the guilt of the accused.
City vs. Robinson, supra. .A.n analysis of the record
below clearly indicates a substantial doubt as to
the guilt of the defendant-appellant, and further that
the evidence abundantly shows that defense of entrapment 'vas clearly proven as a matter of law. Under such
circumstances, this court n1ay so declare and reverse
the judgment of the jury. Sherman vs. U.S., supra,.
Accardi: vs. U.S. (1958), 257 F. 2d 168 (5 Cir.). \Vhere
it ''ras held that the issue of entrapment is a question for
the jury,- unless as a matter of law the accused has established beyond a reasonable doubt that he was entraped.
This criteria places a great burden upon the Defendant
than exists this jurisdiction.
Gerald D. Shelton was ·working for the Salt Lake
Police Department through Gary Parks (R. 123, R. 124);
he was seeuring eompensation by means o.f reimbursed
gas expenses (R. 124); he was permitted to operate his
vehif'lP despite the fact that his license was revoked

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

1G
( 1{. 1:2:1) ; he notified Gary Parks of the proposed burglary at Ream's Bargain Basmnent and told that he
would be protected (R. 122); he was on pre-arranged
bond (R. 99·, R. 123). On the night in question, he went
~PPkinp; the Defendant (R. 151, 152) and asked that the
Defendant aecmnpany him (R. 104). The Defendant had
no intention of committing any crime; he had made other
arrangements (R. 150, 151). It was upon the insistence
of Gerald D. Shelton that the Defendant accompanied
him on the night in question. Further, it was at Gerald
D. Shelton's insistence that the automobiles be switched
(R. 105, 125). Arriving at Ream's Bargain Basement,
the Defendant refused to follow Gerald Shelton's instructions (R. 106). vVhereupon, again at Gerald D.
Shelton's request (R. 106), the Defendant drove to Payless Builder's Supply where the crime was committed.
•Just prior to this, Gerald D. Shelton had placed a note
in the hands of a gas station attendant, said station
being enroute, ·with instructions to call the police (R. 145,

lOG: R. 1-t3, 146).
Considering all of of the circumstances elicited on
the lower court, it is clear that the commission of the
erime

,,~ith

which the Defendant was convicted was the

··produet of the creative ability" of one Gerald D. Shelton
who, by the evidence adduced, was working for the Police
Department. Sherman vs. U.S., 356 U.S. 369, 78 S. Ct.
~19,

:2 L. Ed. 2d

4-t~ .

states:
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"To determine whether entrapment has be:en
established, a line must be drawn between the trap
for the unwary innocent and a trap for the unwary
criminal."
There is no evidence that the Defendant was engaged
in any unlawful business, or that the Defendant possessed
a pre-existing criminal intent. People vs. Malotte (1956),
46 Cal. 2d 59, 292, P. 2d 517; People vs. Terry (1955),
44 Cal. 2d 371, 282 P. 2d 19.
Nor is it clear that this court would permit such
evidence to be allowed. Our sister state expressly distinguished the Federal Rule and California rule in this
regard by stating:
"In ·California, Evidence that Defendant had
previously committed similar crimes or had reputation of being engaged in the commission of such
crimes or was suspected by police of criminal
activities is not admissible on issue of entrapment." People vs. Be1i,for.d, supra.
To allow the conviction below to stand, would he to
endorse the practices of the law enforcement officials
to resort t:o the utilization of know'll felons and devious
methods to apprehend unwary citizens. The initial contac.t and negotiations for corruption come from the
undercover agent, Gerald D. Shelton. The obstacles by
use of agent's aut01nobile was re1noved by the agent.
The polic.e were informed of the time and place of ultiInate incident. a situation similar to that found in Jones
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v~.

State, supra. :Mere willingness to be corrupted can-

not be sufficient. The public policy against such conduct
has been clearly established. Judicial integrity can only
be protected by sustaining the appellant's claim for entrapment.
CONCLUSION
The record below clearly indicated that the court
committed error in not sustaining the Defendant's motion
to dismiss on the second count, to wit, Grand Larceny.
Further, the court committed reversible error in
permitting the jury to separate after the cause had been
finally submitted to them for their deliberation.
The evidence adduced at trial clearly establishes
substantial doubt as to the guilt of the accused and
points out the reprehensible methods employed by the
law enforcement officials in regards to apprehension
and conviction of the Defendant.
The Defendant-Appellant for reasons aforesaid respectfully requests that the conviction of the Defendant
be reversed.
Respectfully submitted,
1\IITSUNAGA & ROSS
By JIMI 1\IITSUNAGA
Attorneys for Appellant

105 Empire Building
231 E. Fourth South
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